The Urban Transport System Optimization when Different Objectives of Municipal Authorities, Transport Operators and Passengers

In recent decades, urban transport systems in our country are changing rapidly. Currently, the passenger demand can be realized in various modes. Thus, the transport model of the city should take into account the passengers travel mode choice. This article discusses the management system of urban passenger transport. The participants of the system are passenger traffic, public transport operator and municipal authorities. For each of the participants the goal functions and a set of strategies are defined. The system of urban passenger transport management is considered. The participants of the system are passengers, public transport operator and municipal authorities. Participants' strategies include the choice of travel mode (passengers), frequency of public transport (public transport operator) and road capacity (municipal authorities). The goal functions are transport costs, costs of roads and travel time. The travel mode choice model is based on logit-distribution. The passengers use the squared deviation from the values of logit-models as the objective function. The relationship between travel time and road capacity is described by the BPR model. The goal of the municipal authorities is the travel time and the cost of roads which depend on the road capacity. The game-theoretic approach is used to describe the urban transportation system. In this article the conditions of the Nash theorem on the existence of equilibrium in non-coalition game of many participants are checked. The compactness and convexity of each participant strategy sets are proved. The quasi-concavity of the each player winning functions according to their own strategies is proved. Thus, the existence of Nash equilibrium for the noncoalition game of three participants (passenger traffic, municipal authorities, public transport) is justified.

выбор способа передвижения, пассажирские перевозки, пропускная способность дорог, теория управления, теория игр, равновесие Нэша, choice of transportation mode, passenger transportation, road capacity, control theory, game theory, Nash equilibrium

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